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CHAE CHAN PING v. UNITED STATES:
IMMIGRATION AS PROPERTY
ROSE CUISON VILLAZOR *
Introduction
There is arguably no other case that is more familiar to immigration legal
scholars than Chae Chan Ping v. United States. 1 Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese
laborer and long-term non-citizen resident of the United States found
himself excluded at the border after a trip to China.2 Border officers denied
him entry under an amendment to the Chinese Exclusion Act,3 which
voided the certificate to re-enter the United States that Ping obtained prior
to embarking on his trip to China. 4 Ping challenged the constitutionality of
the Chinese Exclusion Act but ultimately failed. 5 Upholding Ping’s
exclusion, the Supreme Court declared that Congress’s power to “exclude
aliens from its territory is a proposition” that is not open to controversy. 6
Moreover, maintaining that “jurisdiction over its own territory . . . is an
incident of every independent nation,” the Court explained that if the
United States did not have the ability to exclude non-citizens, it would
mean that “it would be subject . . . to the control over another power.” 7
Crucially, the Court stated that Congress’s decision to deny entry to non-

* Professor of Law & Martin Luther King Jr. Research Scholar, University of
California at Davis School of Law. This Essay builds on and provides historical context to
my remarks at the Oklahoma Law Review’s Symposium on Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). I am indebted to Kit Johnson for inviting me to participate in
such an enriching symposium. This Essay benefitted tremendously from feedback that I
received from participants and attendees at the symposium and a faculty workshop at
Fordham University Law School. I am also grateful to Eleanor Brown, Hanoch Dagan,
Kevin Johnson, Peter Lee, Melissa Murray, Joseph Singer, and Leti Volpp for their
comments on earlier versions of this Essay and to Andrew Alfonso (’15), Sarah Chi (’15),
Anna Pifer-Foote (’16), and Steven Vong (’16) for their excellent research assistance.
1. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). For an in-depth examination
of this case, see Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting: The Origins of
Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 5-29 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds.,
2005) [hereinafter Chin, Chae Chan Ping].
2. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582.
3. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882).
4. Act of Oct. 1, 1888, § 2, 25 Stat. 504, 504 (1888).
5. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 610-11.
6. Id. at 603.
7. Id. at 603-04.
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citizens is “conclusive upon the judiciary.” 8 In so doing, the Supreme Court
laid the foundation for the federal government’s plenary power over
immigration.9 Chae Chan Ping remains good law today and continues to
support the federal government’s virtually unfettered power to regulate and
enforce immigration law. 10
The 125th year anniversary of this foundational immigration and
constitutional law case 11 offers an appropriate time to revisit it. In this
Essay, I explore an overlooked aspect of Ping’s challenge: Ping’s argument
that his right to re-enter the United States constituted a property right. In
particular, Ping contended that the government-issued certificate that he
acquired prior to leaving the United States gave him the right to return to
the United States. 12 Such right was based on “title or right to be in [the
United States] when the writ issued.” 13 Importantly, Ping claimed that this
right could not be “taken away by mere legislation” because it was “a

8. Id. at 606.
9. See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (1998) [hereinafter Chin,
Segregation]; Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidered,
47 CONN. L. REV. 879, 896-97 (2015); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the
Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255. But see Maureen
Callahan VanderMay, The Misunderstood Origins of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 35
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 147, 152-57 (1999) (arguing, among other things, that Chae Chan Ping
v. United States provides little support for the plenary power doctrine).
10. Shoba Sivaprased Wadhia, Business as Usual: Immigration & the National Security
Exception, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1485, 1525 (2010) (explaining that Chae Chan Ping has
never been overruled). A recent Westlaw search using the terms “130 U.S. 581” showed that
at least 231 reported cases cited Chae Chan Ping. For a more recent discussion of the
plenary power doctrine in light of recent caselaw, see Michael Kagan, Plenary Power Is
Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21 (2015),
http://michiganlawreview.org/plenary-power-is-dead/.
11. Curiously, despite Chae Chan Ping’s importance to the development of the federal
government’s plenary power over immigration law, it does not seem to be a case that has
received significant attention in constitutional law casebooks. The following casebooks do
not include the case: GREGORY E. MAGGS & PETER J. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (2d ed. 2011); GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, MARK V. TUSHNET, & PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th ed. 2013).
These casebooks feature the case: PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN, AKHIL
REED AMAR, & REVA B. SIEGEL, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (6th ed.
2014); JONATHAN VARAT, WILLIAM COHEN, & VIKRAM AMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES
AND MATERIALS (13th ed. 2009).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See id.
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valuable riht like an estate in lands.”14 Similar to his other claims, 15 the
Supreme Court rejected this property argument. The Court’s treatment of
his property claim is understandable because Ping’s contention may
perhaps be described as “new property,” 16 which did not become legible to
courts until several decades later.17
In reconsidering Ping’s property arguments, I aim to achieve two goals.
First, as a thought piece, this Essay aims to show what the plenary power
doctrine might have looked like had Ping succeeded in convincing the
Court that his right to return constituted a property right. Second, this Essay
highlights the intersections between property law and immigration law and
the ways in which individual property rights might serve as limiting
principles to the Supreme Court’s formulation of the nation’s absolute right
to exclude non-citizens from the United States.
Part I briefly discusses the facts of Chae Chan Ping. Part II explains
Ping’s argument that his government-issued certificate of re-entry gave rise
to a property violation and analyzes the Supreme Court’s treatment of his
claim. Part III places Ping’s argument within the context of property law’s
development and considers the difference that recognition of his claim
would have made to the plenary power doctrine. Part IV calls for further
exploration of the ways in which property law may promote a more
inclusive immigration law. Part V briefly concludes.
I. Chae Chan Ping v. United States
Arriving in the United States in 1875,18 Chae Chan Ping was one of
approximately 138,941 Chinese who had immigrated to the United States

14. See Brief of Appellant at 5, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)
(No. 1446) [hereinafter Carter, Appellant Brief] (emphasis omitted).
15. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing Ping’s other claims as to
why the Chinese Exclusion Act was unconstitutional, including that he had a contract with
the United States and that the law constituted an ex post facto law).
16. Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785-87 (1964) (arguing that
certain forms of government entitlements and benefits should be recognized as property). I
thank Melissa Murray for suggesting this point to me.
17. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 138 n.2 (1974) (citing Reich’s work in
holding that job security is a form of property); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63
(1970) (citing Reich’s work in recognizing welfare benefits as a form of property); City of
Clearwater v. Garretson, 355 So. 2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (citing Reich’s
work and holding that employment interests constitute property).
18. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582.
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between 1870 and 1880. 19 Their immigration to the United States was made
possible by the Burlingame Treaty—a treaty that was signed between China
and the United States in 1868 20—that guaranteed the citizens of both
countries the same rights and privileges that they would enjoy in their own
countries. 21 Although Chinese were not eligible for naturalization,22 the
Burlingame Treaty recognized their right to acquire permanent residence in
the United States. 23 By 1880, there were approximately 105,465 Chinese
residing in the United States, which represented less than 2% of the overall
population at that time. 24
Most of these Chinese migrants were laborers who toiled in the Gold
Rush and worked for railroad companies in California.25 By the mid-1870s,
racial animosity and economic recession in California led to calls for
restricting the migration of Chinese. 26 Thus, the Burlingame Treaty was
amended on November 17, 1880, to restrict the prospective migration of
Chinese. 27 Those laborers already in the United States, however, could
continue to reside in the country and could also leave and come back to the
United States. 28
Against this hostile background, Ping and other Chinese continued to
reside in California and the West Coast. Anti-Chinese sentiments, however,
continued. California residents in particular sought to further restrict
19. See Chin, Chae Chan Ping, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing the population of Chinese
between 1870 and 1880).
20. Burlingame Treaty, U.S.-China, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739 (1868).
21. See id.
22. Naturalization Act of 1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254 (limiting naturalization to noncitizens who were white or of African descent); see also Thind v. United States, 261 U.S.
204, 215 (1923) (concluding that an Indian immigrant was not eligible for naturalization
because he was not white); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198-99 (1922) (holding
that a Japanese immigrant was not eligible for citizenship because he was not white).
23. See Burlingame Treaty, supra note 20, art. 5; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 592-93
(noting that Article 5 of the Burlingame Treaty provided that the United States and China
recognized the “inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance,
and also the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration . . . for purposes of . . .
permanent resid[ence]”).
24. See Chin, Chae Chan Ping, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing the population of Chinese
in 1880).
25. See Freddy Funes, Note, Beyond the Plenary Power Doctrine: How Critical Race
Theory Can Help Move Us Past the Chinese Exclusion Case, 11 SCHOLAR 341, 343-44
(2009) (discussing the reasons Chinese immigrants went to California).
26. See Chin, Chae Chan Ping, supra note 1, at 8.
27. See id.
28. See id. (explaining that laborers already in the United States could carry
documentation when they left the country to be readmitted).
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Chinese migration because “the presence of Chinese laborers had a baneful
effect upon the material interests of the state” and “their immigration was in
numbers approaching the character of an Oriental invasion.” 29 Congress
complied in 1882 when it passed “An Act to Execute Certain Treaty
Stipulations Relating to Chinese.” 30 Enacted on May 6, 1882, this Act,
which would more popularly be known as the Chinese Exclusion Act,31
suspended “the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States.” 32 Similar
to the 1880 amendment to the Burlingame Treaty, Chinese laborers already
in the United States on November 17, 1880 could remain in the country and
freely leave and reenter the United States. 33
By the time Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, Ping had been a
resident of San Francisco for seven years. 34 At some point, he decided that
he would like to visit China. Because both the 1880 amendment to the
Burlingame Treaty and Chinese Exclusion Act itself provided that he would
be able to return, Ping had no reason to believe that he would be barred
from coming back. Indeed, Ping was likely confident that he would be able
to return to his country of residence. The Chinese Exclusion Act provided
that the government would issue to a Chinese laborer who had been present
in the United States prior to November 17, 1880, a certificate which “shall
entitle the Chinese laborer to whom the same is issued to return to and reenter the United States.” 35 Congress amended the law in 1884—apparently
to address evasions by Chinese 36—and provided that certificates would
29. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595. For a discussion of the history of the Chinese
Exclusion Act, see Chin, Chae Chan Ping, supra note 1, at 8-9; Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the
Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic Mirror" into the Heart of
Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1120 (1998); John Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and
Racial Nativism: Chinese Immigrants and the Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments and Civil Rights Laws, 3 ASIAN L.J. 55, 96 (1996).
30. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882).
31. The press used this term as early as 1888. See, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Act, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 1888, at 4.
32. Chinese Exclusion Act § 1, 22 Stat. at 58.
33. Id. § 3, 22 Stat. at 59. The Act also did not apply to Chinese laborers within ninety
days of the passage of the Act. See id. The law also did not apply to Chinese laborers who
left before Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. See Chew Heong v. United
States, 112 U.S. 536, 560 (1884) (holding that since Heong left in 1881 before the Chinese
Exclusion Act required that he obtain a certificate before leaving the United States, then the
law did not apply to him).
34. See Carter, Appellant Brief, supra note 14, at 4 (explaining that Ping was a resident
of California for twelve years prior to June 2, 1887).
35. Chinese Exclusion Act § 4, 22 Stat. at 59-60.
36. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 598.
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count as the only “‘evidence permissible to establish [the] right of
reentry.’” 37 Relying on these laws, Ping acquired a certificate 38 and, on
June 2, 1887, he sailed for China after having been a California resident for
twelve years. 39 Approximately one year and four months later, on October
7, 1888, Ping presented his certificate when his ship arrived in San
Francisco. 40
Little did Ping know that just a few days before his arrival, Congress
passed yet another amendment to the Chinese Exclusion Act. This
amendment was significant because it provided that “every certificate
heretofore issued in pursuance [of the law] is declared void and of no effect,
and the Chinese laborer claiming admission . . . shall not be permitted to
enter the United States.” 41 In other words, the certificate that Ping had
carried as proof of his lawful right to return to the United States was null
and void. Ping was excluded from the border and detained. 42
II. Ping’s Property Claim to Re-Enter the United States
Represented by counsel, Ping challenged the denial of his entry and
detention under the Chinese Exclusion Act. 43 A person by the name of Jaia
Mon Tong filed a habeas corpus petition on behalf of Ping on October 10,
1888. 44 Unfortunately for Ping, the circuit court judges upheld the Chinese
Exclusion Act and ruled that Ping was “expressly forbidden” by the Act. 45
Ping immediately appealed to the Supreme Court.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 582; see Chae Chan Ping’s Reentry Certificate, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 2 (2015).
39. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582.
40. Id.
41. Act of Oct. 1, 1888, § 2, 25 Stat. 504, 504 (1888).
42. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582 (stating that Ping was detained on his boat
after being denied entry); Paul Yin, The Narratives of Chinese-American Litigation During
the Chinese Exclusion Era, 19 ASIAN AM. L.J. 145, 152 (2012) (explaining that a few months
after the case, Chae Chan Ping was deported and banned from returning).
43. Ping was represented by four lawyers who were considered to be the “Dream Team”
of that time. See Chin, Chae Chan Ping, supra note 1, at 9 (explaining that Ping’s lawyers
were “elite lawyers of the day”). Notably, many of the lawyers of the period that represented
Chinese laborers in challenging the Chinese Exclusion Act were not working pro bono but
rather working on behalf of railroad companies, who had an economic interest in overturning
the law because Chinese worked for lower wages than other workers. See id.
44. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, Supreme Court of the United States, October
1888 Term, Transcript of Record, No. 1446, In the Matter of Chae Chan Ping on Habeas
Corpus, at 1 (petition filed by Jaia Mon Tong) [hereinafter Transcript of Record] (on file
with the Oklahoma Law Review).
45. In re Chae Chan Ping, 36 F. 431, 437 (C.C.N.D. 1888).
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On appeal, Ping emphasized that his case had a broad impact in that the
lower court’s approval of the revocation of his certificate impacted many
other Chinese. As he noted in his “Motion to Advance” to the Supreme
Court, there were “many thousands of these certificates outstanding.” 46
Indeed, at least one scholar noted that there were perhaps 30,000 Chinese
who were residents of the United States but had left the country who had
obtained re-entry certificates prior to leaving. 47 Moreover, Ping urged the
Supreme Court to determine the constitutionality of the Chinese Exclusion
Act so “that those who have acquired property interests here may take some
means of protecting those interests.” 48 According to the Chinese Consulate
at that time, Chinese laborers who had left with certificates had property
interests in the United States in the “amounts [of] several millions of
dollars.” 49
In seeking to overturn the Chinese Exclusion Act, Ping raised a number
of arguments on appeal. Scholars have examined in detail several of these
arguments, including that his exclusion violated rights that he obtained
under a treaty between the United States and China, 50 that the denial of his
re-entry constituted a violation of a contract that he had with the United
States 51 and that the law was an ex post facto law. 52 Less scholarly attention
has been fully devoted to the nature of his claim that his exclusion violated
his property rights. 53

46. See Transcript of Record, supra note 44, at Motion to Advance, at 3.
47. See Chin, Chae Chan Ping, supra note 1, at 11.
48. See Transcript of Record, supra note 44, at Motion to Advance, at 2.
49. Id. at 3.
50. See, e.g., Angela Banks, The Trouble with Treaties: Immigration and Judicial
Review, 84 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1219, 1227-31 (2010) (examining Ping’s challenge to the
Chinese Exclusion Act as a violation of treaties between the United States and China).
51. See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, United States Immigration Policy: Contract or Human
Rights Law?, 32 NOVA L. REV. 309, 314-15 (2008) (noting Ping’s contract claim, which the
Supreme Court rejected).
52. See Chin, Chae Chan Ping, supra note 1, at 11-16.
53. To be sure, scholars have noted that Ping did have a property claim, which he
contended emanated from treaties that were signed between China and the United States. See
Chin, Chae Chan Ping, supra note 1, at 15; Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in
Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary
Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 69-76 (2002) (discussing the Supreme
Court’s rejection of Ping’s claimed vested property rights violation based on treaties
between the United States and China). Yet, the literature has yet to fully explore the scope of
Ping’s property-based arguments.
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A. Ping’s Claim That He Had a Vested Property Right to Return
In three separate briefs to the Supreme Court, Ping’s lawyers put forward
four arguments as to why his exclusion from the United States constituted a
violation of his property rights. 54 One argument focused on the concept of
the state intentionally conferring on Ping what constitutes a property right.
In particular, one of his lawyers, George Hoadly—whose brief was the
lengthiest of all three submitted briefs—contended that the plain language
of an 1881 treaty between China and the United States demonstrated that
Congress intended “to vest appellant with the right to re-enter the United
States.” 55 Using statutory analysis, Hoadly emphasized that section four of
the treaty used the word “entitle” to grant to the Chinese laborers the right
to return. He explained that, “[t]he word ‘entitle’” was not loosely or idly
adopted. It is a word of vesting, descriptive of an acquired condition, right
or title.” 56 Thus, Hoadly asserted that Congress essentially functioned as the
“grantor” who conveyed to Ping, the “grantee” title, or the right to come

54. It is unclear whether Ping raised his property arguments during the habeas corpus
hearing. The record does not include a transcript of the hearing itself. Moreover, the habeas
corpus petition that was filed on his behalf did not make specific property arguments but
instead made a general argument that the Chinese Exclusion Act was invalid. The circuit
court, in upholding the law, relied on three grounds for ruling against Ping (which
presumably addressed arguments raised during the habeas corpus hearing): (1) there was no
contract between Ping and the United States; (2) that Congress had the authority to pass the
Chinese Exclusion Act and override previous treaties governing Chinese laborers; and (3)
the Chinese Exclusion Act did not constitute an ex post facto law. See In re Chae Chan Ping,
36 F. 431 (C.C.N.D. 1888). Thus, the circuit did not specifically address a property
argument that may have been raised during the hearing. Nevertheless, a closer look at the
opinion alludes to what Ping would raise as a property rights violation on appeal. In
particular, the circuit court, in responding to Ping’s claim that he was “divested a right [that
was] indefeasibly vested,” explained:
Some rights accrue and become indefeasibly vested by covenants or
stipulations that have ceased to be executory and have become fully executed,
as in the case of title to property acquired thereunder. But we do not regard the
privilege of going and coming from one country to another as of this class of
rights.
Id. at 432. Here, the court appears to be referring to rights associated with the system of
estates in land in which a defeasible fee has yet to become indefeasible until the happening
of an event, which leads to the estate becoming an absolutely indefeasibly vested fee. See 28
AM. JUR. 2D Estates § 142 (updated Feb. 2015).
55. See George Hoadly, Brief for Appellant at 34, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581 (1889) (No. 1446). [hereinafter Hoadly, Brief for Appellant].
56. Id. at 35.
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back to the United States, when it provided in the 1881 treaty that Ping
would be able to return. 57
Convincing the Court to accept that the government intended to convey
Ping a property right was critical and relates to a second property argument:
that such property cannot be taken without due process of law. Once a
“thing” is considered property, it gains paramount protection from the
law. 58 Hoadly’s brief maintained that Ping’s “right to return . . . and resume
his actual residence in California, and to remain” in the United States are as
“secure from legislative intrusion and disturbance as would have been his
title to and possession of property acquired by the permission of treaty
stipulations.” 59 In other words, Ping’s vested property right to return is akin
to ownership in fee simple absolute that would have received protection
under the treaties. Indeed, Hoadly’s brief emphasized this point. He noted,
“He who is ‘entitled’ cannot be divested, except by the process of eminent
domain or during a state of war.” 60
Another one of Ping’s lawyers, James Carter, expanded on the argument
regarding the protection that law ought to accord to property rights.
Conceding that the federal government has the power to deny “the entry
into its territories of the subjects of a foreign state,” 61 Carter nevertheless
argued that Congress did not have the right to “prohibit the return to this
country of the appellant.” 62 Ping had a “vested right to return, which could
not be taken from him by an exercise of mere legislative power.” 63
Underscoring that Ping’s property claim was not based in contract law 64
and echoing arguments that Hoadly made in his brief, Carter noted,
It will be observed that the right of the appellant to return to the
United States is based . . . upon a title or right to be in that
57. Under the common law, the grantor is the typically the person who owns an estate in
fee simple and the grantee is the person who acquires property from the grantor.
58. The government may not deprive a person of property without due process of law.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
59. See Hoadly, Brief for Appellant, supra note 55, at 20.
60. Id. Curiously, Hoadly does not expand on his eminent domain argument by
explaining, for example, what would constitute just compensation for the taking of Ping’s
property. Further, it should be noted that although this line of argument invoked eminent
domain, Hoadly subsequently relates such vested right as part of a contractual obligation. Id.
at 34-35.
61. See Carter, Appellant Brief, supra note 14, at 3.
62. See id. at 4.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 5 (“[T]he right of appellant to return to the United States is based, so far
as above insisted upon, not upon any contract between him and that Government.”).
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country when the writ issued—a title or right fully acquired by,
and vested in him by his coming here under the permission of
the laws and treaties under which he came. It was granted to him
by law; but, when once granted, could not be taken away by
mere law. 65
Again, Ping’s argument here is that his vested right was similar to title in
fee simple that may not be taken automatically by mere legislation. Indeed,
Carter points out that such a right was a “valuable right like an estate in
lands, and the taking of it away would necessarily involve the taking away
of his liberty.” 66
Carter raised a third property claim: not only did Ping have a right to reenter the United States but he also had “a lawful right to be in that United
States.” 67 Emphasizing that Ping had been a resident of California for
twelve years after deciding to make a permanent home in the United States
as a result of the Burlingame Treaty, 68 Ping cannot be “ejected from the
United States by mere legislation.” 69 In so doing, Carter’s theory is slightly
distinguishable from Hoadly’s by underscoring Ping’s connections to the
United States as a long-term resident. Hoadly’s argument appears to invoke
a property right that is grounded on continuous and long-term possession
and use of property (which in this case would be the United States).
Establishing one’s deep roots to property is an accepted rationale that has
long animated two ways of acquiring a property right—adverse
possession 70 and prescriptive easement.71
However, neither adverse possession nor prescriptive easement is
directly on point because both doctrines require non-permissive possession
or use of property over a statutory period for property rights to vest. 72
Certainly, in this case, Ping had resided in the United States for over a
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 4.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV.
611, 665 (1988) (explaining that under adverse possession, “property owners lose their
property to a possessor of that property if the possession has been sufficiently open and
longstanding and without the owner's permission”).
71. See id. at 669 (recognizing that when a prescriptive easement is established, “the
true owner loses not the entire property but the right to prevent another from using her
property in a specific way”).
72. See id. at 665-69 (explaining the requirements for adverse possession and
prescriptive easements).
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decade, which would satisfy some jurisdictions’ requirements for adverse
possession or prescriptive easement. 73 However, Ping’s possession or use of
a residence in the United States was permissive during his residence in the
country. As explained previously, the original Chinese Exclusion Act did
not apply to Chinese laborers like Ping who were present in 1880 when
Congress passed the law in 1882. Non-permissive access to the United
States would not begin until his exclusion from the United States based on
the 1888 amendment to the Chinese Exclusion Act that voided his
certificate.
A fourth line of property argument focused on the concept of labor as
property. Specifically, Harvey Brown and Thomas Riordan argued that
denying Ping and other Chinese laborers the right to re-enter the United
States violated their right to acquire property. 74 Quoting In re Tiburcio
Parrott, a case which struck down a law that penalized the employment of
Chinese laborers, 75 Brown noted “[n]o enumeration would, I think, be
attempted of the privileges, immunities . . . of man in civilized society
which would exclude the right to labor for a living.” Evoking John Locke’s
labor theory of property, 76 Brown further explained that the right to labor is
“an inviolable as the right of property, for property is the offspring of
labor.” 77 Applying these principles to Ping’s situation, Brown maintained
that, under the Burlingame Treaty, Ping “had acquired the right to live in
the United States to labor, to acquire property and to protect it in the same
manner as any citizen would.” 78 Indeed, because Ping had been a resident
of the United States for several years, he had presumably acquired property
as a result of his labor and thus, his exclusion from the United States means

73. Ping resided in the United States for twelve years prior to his trip to China. See
Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582 (mentioning that Ping resided in the United States from
1875 until 1887).
74. See Harvey S. Brown & Thomas Riordan, Brief for Appellant at 1, 5, Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (No. 1446) (italics omitted) [hereinafter Brown
& Riordan, Appellant Brief].
75. 1 F. 481, 499 (C.C.D. 1880) (invalidating California statute that criminalized the
employment of Chinese laborers).
76. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 290-91 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (stating that every person has the right to the products or fruits of
one’s labor).
77. See Brown & Riordan, Appellant Brief, supra note 74, at 7 (quoting In re Tiburcio
Parrot, 1 F. at 498).
78. See id. at 9.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

148

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:137

that he—as well as thousands of other Chinese immigrants—are being
prevented from enjoying the fruits of their employment. 79
In sum, although Ping’s “right to return” to the United States might not
constitute property as typically understood under the common law, Ping
nevertheless claimed that it was sufficiently close to it. Through four
specific property arguments, Ping contended that the government could not
automatically take away his right without violating his due process rights.
B. The Government’s Response
Expectedly, the briefs filed on behalf of the United States disagreed that
Ping had a vested property right to return. 80 The United States brief
contended that Ping’s residence in the country was “only by indulgence of
the Government”—that is, by “permission only.” 81 The State of California
submitted two briefs in support of the United States. The Attorney General
of California submitted a brief, and so did two lawyers who were appointed
by the state.
The California Attorney General G.A. Johnson acknowledged that a
treaty may confer certain rights on non-citizens, including “rights of
property by descent or inheritance.” 82 Yet, Attorney General Johnson
asserted that there “are no rights of property by descent or inheritance” or
“fixed private property rights” that were involved in the case.83 Consistent
with the lower court’s decision, Attorney General Johnson articulated a
very traditional conception of what constitutes property.
The two state-appointed attorneys, John F. Swift and Stephen M. White,
provided a more fulsome counter-argument to Ping’s property assertions.
At the outset, this brief also conceded that if a treaty allowed a non-citizen
to purchase property, then such property “is absolutely and beyond the

79. See Transcript of Record, supra note 44, at Motion to Advance, 2.
80. There were three briefs filed on behalf of the United States: brief filed by Solicitor
General G.A. Jenks, brief submitted by the Attorney General G.A. Johnson, and a brief filed
by Stephen M. White and John F. Swift, who appear to be counsel appointed by the State of
California.
81. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11, Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (No. 1446). The brief did not elaborate further
and instead focused on addressing Ping’s other arguments.
82. Brief of the State of California Attorney General as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 8-9, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (No. 1446).
83. See id. at 9.
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reach of Congressional attack.” 84 Yet, similar to the United States’ position,
the special counsel’s brief described Ping’s ability to enter the country as a
privilege. 85 Echoing the bundle of sticks analogy often used to describe
property rights, 86 this brief rejected the idea that Congress did not have the
“right to exclude” non-citizens like Ping. 87 Moreover, the appointed
counsel’s brief maintained that Ping was not deprived of his property in
violation of his due process. Underscoring the view that property refers to
“real property,” the brief states that, “[n]o one is attempting to get any of
Ping’s property[;] in fact, it is not shown that he has an estate[.]” 88
C. The Supreme Court’s Property Analysis
Ultimately, Ping’s arguments that he had a vested right to return to the
United States were unavailing. 89 Although the Supreme Court recognized
that the Burlingame Treaty conferred certain rights to Chinese laborers, it
held that a subsequently enacted treaty—the 1888 amendments—trumped
the earlier treaty. 90 Importantly, the Court rejected Ping’s claim that his
right to return constituted property akin to an estate in land. It distinguished
Ping’s certificate which it described as “personal and untransferable” in
character from those property rights that flow from treaties that vest and the
ownership of which cannot be destroyed. 91
Critically, the Supreme Court focused on qualities that make a “thing”
property. One such trait, explained the Court, is that property is “capable of
sale and transfer or other disposition.” 92 Ping’s certificate, however, was
“personal and untransferable” and thus, lacked the essential qualities of
property. Accordingly, it may be voided. 93

84. Brief of John F. Swift and Stephen M. White, Counsel Appointed by the State of
California, at 10, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (No. 1446)
[hereinafter Brief of Swift & White].
85. See id. at 11.
86. For examples of courts using the “bundle of sticks” metaphor, see Audrey G.
McFarlane, The Properties of Instability: Markets, Prediction, Racialized Geography, and
Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855, 864 n.35.
87. Brief of Swift & White, supra note 84, at 11-12.
88. Id. at 15.
89. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603 (holding that nothing in the treaties “impair[s]
the validity of the act of congress of October 1, 1888”).
90. See id. at 600.
91. Id. at 609.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 610.
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Despite rejecting Ping’s property claim, the Supreme Court used
property language to describe the scope of Ping’s rights. Specifically, the
Supreme Court characterized Ping’s certificate as a license. A license is a
personal property right given by an owner or possessor of property to a
non-possessor. 94 Importantly, a license may typically be revoked at any
time. 95 Applying that property concept in this case, the Court noted that,
“Whatever license, therefore, Chinese laborers may have obtained, previous
to the [Chinese Exclusion Act] act of October 1, 1888, to return to the
United States after their departure, is held at the will of the government,
revocable at any time, at its pleasure.”96
Ironically, although the Supreme Court refused to accept Ping’s property
claim, the Court’s holding nevertheless resulted in the recognition of strong
property rights in favor of the United States. In particular, by holding that
Congress may exclude Ping—a long-term non-citizen resident of the United
States—and other Chinese laborers, the Supreme Court essentially
articulated that the federal government had a very strong, unimpaired and
absolute right to exclude. The right to exclude has long been considered the
strongest “stick” in the bundle of property rights. 97 One of the normative
justifications for protecting the right to exclude is its ability to promote an
owner’s autonomy and sovereignty over her estate, including the right to
exclude persons from her property with the protection of the state. 98 The
connection between property and sovereignty is particularly evident in
Chae Chan Ping. Stating that the United States is a sovereign nation, the
Supreme Court reasoned that the federal government has the duty to
“preserve [the nation’s] independence, and give security against foreign
aggression and encroachment.” 99 Thus, here, the Supreme Court
emphasized the role of the United States’ right to exclude as a means of
achieving safety and security within its own property.
94. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 512 cmt. a (1944) (defining a license,
generally, as “any permitted unusual freedom of action”).
95. See id. § 519 cmt. a (explaining that licenses are “terminable at the will of the
possessor”). But see infra Part IV (discussing circumstances that prohibit the revocation of
licenses).
96. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.
97. See Kristine S. Tardiff, Analyzing Every Stick in the Bundle: Why the Examination
of a Claimant’s Property Interests Is the Most Important Inquiry in Every Fifth Amendment
Takings Case, FED. LAW., Oct. 2007, at 30, 31 (explaining that the right to exclude “is
frequently described as the most ‘fundamental’ and ‘treasured’ of all property rights”).
98. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8 (1927),
available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol13/iss1/3.
99. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
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Importantly, the Supreme Court’s holding illuminates the power of the
right to exclude and its connections to exclusions from private and public
property on the basis of race. 100 In this case, the Court notes that the federal
government has the power to exercise its right of exclusion to address
aggression in whatever form it may appear, including when “vast hordes of
[foreign] people are crowding in upon” the United States. 101 The Chinese
Exclusion Act cast Chinese laborers as the aggressors that needed to be
excluded from the United States. Although it was not the first immigration
law that excluded on the basis of race, 102 it was the first one that explicitly
made race an exclusionary factor and one that escaped equal protection
review. 103 Indeed, the Supreme Court did not find the law’s race-based
content problematic, noting that if Congress leaders determine that “the
presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not
assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace . . . [such] determination is
conclusive upon the judiciary.” 104
Through these words, the Supreme Court established Congress’s plenary
power over immigration and, in so doing, upheld Ping’s exclusion from the
United States. Thus, Ping ultimately had to be ejected from the United
States. Having been released on bond, Ping was residing in Chinatown, San
Francisco during the pendency of his case. He continued to reside in

100. I have written previously on the extent to which property law was deployed to
exclude persons on the basis of race. See Rose Cuison Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama v.
California: At the Intersection of Property, Race and Citizenship, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 979
(2010) [hereinafter Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama]; see also ALFRED BROPHY, ALBERTO
LOPEZ & KALI MURRAY, INTEGRATING SPACES: PROPERTY AND RACE (2010).
101. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606. The Court’s description of Chinese as
aggressors who were “crowding” upon the United States is troubling and consistent with the
anti-Chinese sentiment of the period. As noted earlier, the population of Chinese in the
United States during this period was approximately two percent of the U.S. entire
population. See supra note 24.
102. See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration
Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 641 (2005) (stating that in 1875, Congress passed the Page
Act, which was the first federal restrictive immigration statute and it was done to target
primarily Chinese women).
103. To be sure, as Jack Chin has pointed out, Ping did not bring a claim that the Chinese
Exclusion Act was racially discriminatory under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Chin, Chae Chan Ping, supra note 1, at 15. Even if he did, it
would have failed. At that time, the Equal Protection Clause applied only to the states and
although the Due Process of the Fifth Amendment later incorporated the equal protection
principle, the Supreme Court has noted that the Fifth Amendment does not provide a
guarantee against discrimination by Congress. Id.
104. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
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Chinatown after the Supreme Court issued its opinion. A news article
reported that it was not until “the indignant howl of an ever-vigilant press”
that the authorities were awakened “to a realization of the fact that Ping . . .
had intended to stay.” 105 As a result, government authorities contacted one
of his lawyers, Riordan, who then brought Ping to the dock to be placed on
a ship to sail back to China.106 Fearing that Ping might “leave the vessel in a
surreptitious manner,” federal authorities reportedly “locked him in a
statesroom and set a guard over it until the vessel should set out to sea.” 107
He was never heard from again. 108
III. Why Property in Immigration Law
Ping’s articulation of his property right did not fit the mold of what the
Supreme Court understood as property. But what if he prevailed? What
difference would it had made had the Supreme Court recognized that Ping
had a property right to return to the United States? This Part explores the
answers to these questions and contends that if Ping succeeded, the plenary
power doctrine would arguably look different today.
A. Ping’s “New Property” Claim
To understand the difference that Ping’s property claim would have
made to his assertion that he should be allowed to re-enter the United
States, it would be helpful to consider why his property argument failed to
convince the Court in the first instance. As may have been evident from the
Supreme Court’s opinion, the Court had a traditional understanding of what
constituted “property.” 109 Justice Field emphasized “real property” as the
type of property he believed would have received protection from
treaties. 110 Additionally, he emphasized that the concept of a government

105. Chan Ping Leaves US.: He Refuses to Pay His Fare and the Company Takes Him as
a Guest, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1889, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archivefree/pdf?res=990DE6DF1130E633A25751C0A96F9C94689FD7CF.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. See Paul Yin, The Narratives of Chinese-American Litigation During the Chinese
Exclusion Era, 19 ASIAN AM. L.J. 145, 152 (2012) (explaining that a few months after the
case, Chae Chan Ping was deported and banned from returning).
109. See supra Part II.A (examining the district court’s analysis of Ping’s property
claim); supra Part II.C (analyzing the Supreme Court’s examination of Ping’s property
argument).
110. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.
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entitlement—such as the conferral of a right to return to the United States—
could not possibly constitute property. 111
Yet, although the notion of a government entitlement as property was
incomprehensible to the Supreme Court in 1889, it would eventually
become recognized as such in the next century. Specifically, in 1964, in a
groundbreaking article, Professor Charles Reich called for the recognition
of a “new property.” 112 He explained that the government has become a
major source of wealth by distributing different types of rights, benefits,
privileges, services, and power to various individuals.113 These varied forms
of “largess” or public entitlements have become the main source of wealth
or income for many individuals.114 The governments that issue these
benefits or “largess” have acquired tremendous power 115 over the
distribution, regulation and maintenance of these benefits and privileges.116
Accordingly, Reich contended that these benefits constituted new forms of
property and, similar to traditional property, should be given legal
protection.117 Because these “forms of largess . . . are closely linked to
status[,]” they must be “deemed to be held as of right.” 118 As such, they
should be bound to a system of regulation “rather than a system based upon
denial, suspension and revocation.” 119
Notably, Reich’s call for the protection of government benefits and
privileges as property led to important individual procedural due process
protection. 120 In the landmark case Goldberg v. Kelley, 121 the Supreme
111. See id.
112. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964).
113. See id. at 734-38.
114. See id. at 734-39.
115. See id. at 746 ( “When government—national, state or local—hands out something
of value, whether a relief check or a television license, government’s power grows forthwith;
it automatically gains such power as is necessary and proper to supervise its largess.”).
116. See id. at 751 ( “[G]ranting, regulation, and revocation of government largess is
carried on by procedures which, in varying degrees, represent short-cuts that tend to
augment the power of the grantor at the expense of the recipient.”).
117. See id. at 785.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Ronald A. Cass & Jack M. Beermann, Throwing Stones at the Mudbank: The
Impact of Scholarship on Administrative Law, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 9-13 (1993) (explaining
the significance of Reich’s article influencing the Supreme Court); Rebecca E. Zietlow,
Giving Substance to Process: Countering the Due Process Counterrevolution, 75 DENV. U.
L. REV. 9, 12-14 (1997) (referring to Reich as the “‘father’ of the due process revolution”).
But see David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1780 (2013)
(noting that after the Supreme Court decided Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), “the
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Court cited Reich in noting that a welfare entitlement was “more like
‘property’ than a ‘gratuity’” 122 and thus, a welfare recipient should be
entitled to an evidentiary hearing “before the termination of benefits.” 123
Rejecting the view that a welfare benefit is a privilege rather than a right,
the Court explained that public assistance benefits provide their recipients
with daily essentials including food, housing, and medical care. 124
Accordingly, beneficiaries have the procedural right under the Due Process
Clause to a hearing on whether the benefit should be discontinued.125 Since
Goldberg, the Supreme Court and other courts applied Reich’s “new
property” to other contexts.126
Ping was thus ahead of his time when he contended that the governmentissued certificate evidencing his right to return constituted property that
could not be automatically revoked without violating his constitutional
rights. 127 And, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court seemed strongly
resistant to according “property” status to Ping’s claim. Rejecting the
characterization of Ping’s asserted right to return as property, the Court
remainder of Reich’s insights into the role of property in protecting individual rights in
modern society was largely forgotten”).
121. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
122. See id. at 262 n.8.
123. See id. at 259.
124. See id. at 262-64.
125. See id. at 268.
126. See, e.g., Geoffrey Jones, The Fifth Amendment Due Process Rights of Interdicted
Haitian Refugees, 21 HASTINGS CONTS. L.Q. 1071, 1087-88 (1994) (noting cases that cited
Reich’s “New Property” article); see also Joseph Blocker, Reputation as Property in Virtual
Economies, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 120 (2009) (applying Reich’s “new property” to
reputation online); Paula Lindsey Wilson, Note, Rejection of the New Property Right Theory
as Viewed Through the Rear Window: Stewart v. Abend, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 155, 189-90
(1990) (exploring how different courts treated “new property” in the context of copyright).
But see Super, supra note 120, at 1780 (discussing the limits of Reich’s influence since
Goldberg).
127. At least one legal scholar has applied Reich’s concept of “new property” in the
immigration context. See Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Visa as Property, Visa as
Collateral, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1084-85 (2011). Brown wrote,
Although a visa would not typically be thought of as either a franchise or a
license, in fact, a visa is deeply analogous to both. Indeed, U.S. visas may be
described as licenses to work in the United States. Like licenses, visas make it
possible for their recipients to engage in particular kinds of work. Like other
forms of licensees, visa holders are only able to receive what is usually their
primary source of income because they hold visas. Thus, the “new property”
analogy fits.
Id. at 1085.
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instead classified Ping’s right to return as a mere benefit. 128 Notably, the
Court’s framing of Ping’s right as not property did not rest on his status as a
non-citizen. The Court acknowledged that non-citizens’ property rights
may, depending on the circumstances, deserve protection. It mentioned, for
instance, that there are some property rights held by non-citizens that
emanate from treaties and are thus enforceable among private parties,
including “rights of property by descent or inheritance. 129 Importantly, the
Court acknowledged that the extinguishment of a treaty would not abolish
these property rights. 130 The Court explained, however, that what Ping had
was a privilege or a benefit conferred to him by the government. 131
Crucially, such benefit was not protectable property. As the Court
explained, “Between property rights not affected by the termination or
abrogation of a treaty, and expectations of benefits from the continuance of
existing legislation, there is as wide a difference as between realization and
hopes.” 132
Yet, the fact that Ping merely had a license or benefit might not
necessarily be detrimental to his property claim today. 133 Applying Reich’s
“new property” allows us to consider the value of the certificate to return to
Ping and other Chinese laborers as well as the procedural protections that
should have been accorded to their property. For Ping and the thousands of
Chinese who had left the United States with the belief that they could
return, the certificate constituted their return ticket that would have allowed
them to continue working and residing in their country of residence. For
many, the certificate would have given them the ability to recoup their
possessions and perhaps reunite with their families. Seen from the lens of
“new property,” Congress’s automatic revocation of Ping’s certificate and
right to return may be regarded as a violation of Ping’s property rights. 134

128. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 610.
129. Id. (quoting The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884)).
130. Id. (stating that it would be “most mischievous to admit that the extinguishment of
the treaty extinguished the right to such estate”).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. As Reich noted in his article, courts have described certain benefits or “largess” as
“privileges” even though they should be considered “rights.” See Reich, supra note 112, at
740.
134. See id. at 740 (“If the holder of a license had a ‘right,’ he might be entitled to a
hearing before the license could be revoked; a ‘mere privilege’ might be revoked without
notice or a hearing.”).
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B. Difference that Property Would Have Made
Although ultimately unsuccessful, Ping’s property claim allows us to
imagine what the plenary power doctrine would have looked like had Ping
prevailed. Arguably, had the Supreme Court accepted Ping’s contention
that he had a vested property right to return, the plenary power would not
be the absolute, powerful and unrestricted doctrine as it is today. 135 That is,
the Court would have recognized a limiting principle to the plenary power
doctrine based on Ping’s individual property rights. Thus, at minimum,
Ping (and other returning Chinese laborers who are also long-term residents
of the United States and had permission to return) would have been entitled
to a hearing on the validity of the automatic revocation of his certificate
without notice. Perhaps more broadly, the Court would have acknowledged
that some non-citizens deserve greater protection than other non-citizens
because of their deeper connections to the United States. After all, Ping
considered the United States to be his residence, having lived in California
for over twelve years before he left for China. He was not an immigrant
who was seeking entry for the first time but rather a long-term resident of
the United States. Such long-term presence and link to the United States
may be viewed to have matured in ways that would have conferred him
with a non-revocable right to return.
Thus, the Court would have rejected the view that the nation has an
absolute right to exclude non-citizens under the plenary power doctrine.
Instead, the Court would have established a qualified right to exclude—one
that recognized that the federal government has the power to exclude noncitizens but that, in some circumstances, such power must give way to the
rights of some non-citizens to gain access to the United States. Had the
Court inaugurated such a more tempered right to exclude in the first
instance, immigration law as we know it would look remarkably different.
To be sure, today, lawful permanent residents are accorded more rights
than other non-citizens when seeking to return to the United States. In
Landon v. Plasencia, 136 the Supreme Court held that lawful permanent
residents are entitled to due process rights during exclusion hearings. 137
Maria Plasencia, a lawful permanent resident of the United States for five
years, was excluded at the border after a brief visit to Mexico and

135. See Chin, Chae Chan Ping supra note 1, at 1 (“Congressional power to determine
who may come or stay, and who may not, is virtually unrestricted.”).
136. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
137. See id. at 31.
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attempting to illegally transport noncitizens to the United States. 138
Although the Court maintained that Plasencia must go through an exclusion
and not deportation hearing where she would have the burden of proving
her admissibility, it recognized that “once an alien gains admission to our
country and begins to develop ties that go with permanent residence, his
constitutional status changes accordingly.” 139 As such, she was entitled to
an analysis that would have balanced her interests and the interests of the
government. 140 Congress would later amend the Immigration and
Nationality Act to provide that lawful permanent residents who are seeking
to re-enter the United States would be treated differently from those noncitizens who are seeking to enter the first time. 141 Under section
101(a)(13)(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), lawful
permanent residents are regarded as not seeking admission unless, among
other things, they abandoned or relinquished their status 142 or had been
absent from the United States for a continuous period in excess of 180
days. 143 These constitutional and statutory protections conferred to lawful
permanent residents in the context of (re)entering the United States show
that certain non-citizens are bestowed more rights than others.
Yet, those rights are generally limited to lawful permanent residents who
have taken “innocent, casual and brief excursions”144 or who have not been
absent from the United States for more than 180 days. Indeed, it is unclear
whether Ping would have been allowed to re-enter the United States under
Plasencia and section 101(a)(13)(c) today. Because he was absent from the
United States for over one year and four months, he would have to establish
that he did not abandon his residency. Additionally, as a result of Ping’s
lengthy absence from the United States, immigration officers would likely
invoke section 101(a)(13)(c) and deem Ping as a non-citizen seeking
admission for the first time. He would then have to show that he is both
admissible and not inadmissible.145

138. For a more detailed analysis of Landon v. Plasencia, see Kevin R. Johnson, Maria
and Joseph Plasencia’s Lost Weekend: The Case of Landon v. Plasencia, in IMMIGRATION
STORIES 221-44 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005).
139. Landon, 459 U.S. at 32.
140. See id. at 34 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1975)).
141. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(i) (2012).
142. See id.
143. Id. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(ii).
144. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963).
145. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (providing that a non-citizen seeking admission must
show that she is clearly and beyond any doubt admissible).
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In brief, revisiting Ping’s property claims—albeit futile given the nature
of his arguments as akin to “new property”—over a century later allows us
to visualize what the starting point of immigration law could have looked
like. It is plausible that had Ping convinced the Supreme Court that he had a
property right to re-enter the United States that the plenary power doctrine
would have some limits at least. Such qualified right to exclude would have
taken into account the rights of, at minimum, lawful permanent residents of
the United States and, perhaps more broadly, to any non-citizen long-term
residents with deep ties and connections to the country who are seeking to
return or re-enter the United States.
IV. Intersection of Immigration and Property
Examining Ping’s property claims is valuable for another and more
extensive reason: it allows an exploration of the ways in which property law
intersects with immigration law and how each doctrine might inform the
other. 146 To be sure, I recognize that immigration law and property law are
146. I have previously examined the ways in which property law may be used in
immigration law. See Rose Cuison Villazor, Citizenship for the Guest Workers of the
Northern Mariana Islands, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 525 (2015) (arguing for the conferral of
lawful permanent residency and citizenship to long-term guest workers in the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands using the concept of jus nexi—acquisition
of citizenship based on one’s deeply rooted and strong connections to a territory and a theory
that borrows from property law’s adverse possession). For more information on how
property law and immigration law intersect, see generally Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama,
supra note 100, at 1003-12 (discussing connections between immigration and property law).
Other scholars have also explored the connection between the two. See e.g., Brown, Visa as
Property, supra note 127 at 1085 (discussing the immigration and property connection, how
visas are a form of “new property” by providing a certain legal status granted by the
government that allows access to a particular set of economic benefits); David A. Super, A
New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1812-18 (2013) (examining the parallels
between immigration law and property law); Leti Volpp, Imaginings of Space in
Immigration Law, 9 LAW, CULTURE & HUMAN. 456, 466-67 (2013) (examining the metaphor
of immigration as property). Scholars and commentators have also examined how property
law may be deployed in immigration law. See AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY:
CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY 184-89 (2009) (evoking the adverse possession
principle in arguing for granting citizenship to undocumented immigrants based on the
length of their stay in the receiving country); Monica Gomez, Note, Immigration by Adverse
Possession: Common Law Amnesty for Long-Residing Illegal Immigrants in the U.S., 22
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 105 (2007); Timothy J. Lukes & Minh T. Hoang, Open and Notorious:
Adverse Possession and Immigration Reform, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 123 (2008). For a
broader and more theoretical exploration of property law in immigration, see Jeremy
Waldron, Immigration: A Lockean Approach (NYU School of Law Pub. Research Paper No.
15-37, May 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2652710. Other

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss1/7

2015]

CHAE CHAN PING: IMMIGRATION AS PROPERTY

159

two distinct areas of law. Property law is private law and developed from
the common law, 147 which relied heavily on William Blackstone (dominion
and control), 148 John Locke (labor), 149 and Jeremy Bentham (settled
expectations). 150 By contrast, immigration law is public law and is based on
the Immigration and Nationality Act. 151
Yet, a closer look at these two areas reveals overlooked commonalities.
In particular, both deal with the tension between a person’s right to gain
entry to or remain in a particular space and the right of the owner or
possessor to exclude the person seeking access or desiring to stay in the
property. In property law, this tension occurs in a number of situations,
including when an individual is seeking entry to property that is privately
held, 152 private property that is open to the public,153 or a privately owned
place that is recognized as a place of public accommodation.154
Additionally, property law recognizes that persons who do not have
privileged entry or consent to enter property may be ejected from private
scholars have examined the ways in which property law affects the lives of non-citizens. See,
e.g., Allison Brownell Tirres, Ownership Without Citizenship: The Creation of Noncitizen
Property Rights, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, passim (2013); Allison Brownell Tirres, Property
Outliers: Non-Citizens, Property Rights and State Power, 27 GEO. IMM. L.J. 77, passim
(2012); Keith Aoki, No Right to Own? The Early Twentieth Century “Alien Land Laws” as
a Prelude to the Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37, passim (1998).
147. See generally JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES AND
PRACTICES 12, 736 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing how trespass and the landlord-tenant
relationship are property concepts developed from common law).
148. “There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the
affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right
of any other individual in the universe.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 2 (1753).
149. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17-18 (Bobbs-Merrill ed.
1952) (“[W]hatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature has provided and left it in,
he has mixed labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
property.”).
150. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 138 (Boston: Weeks, Jordan & Co.,
R. Hildreth trans. 1840) (“[The] idea of property consists in an established expectation . . . if
being able to draw . . . an advantage from the thing possessed.”).
151. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012).
152. See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 371-75 (N.J. 1971) (discussing whether
defendants’ entrance upon private property to aid migrant farmworkers constituted trespass).
153. See Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 372 (N.J. 1982) (discussing
whether owners of places open to the public enjoy an absolute right to exclude patrons).
154. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000a-6 (2012); see Denny v.
Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that the list in § 2000a is
exhaustive).
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property. 155 Armed with trespass law, owners can thus remove non-owners
and seek damages for harms associated with unprivileged entry. 156 Such
power to both exclude and remove non-owners is based on the right to
exclude—which, as noted earlier, has long been regarded as the strongest
“stick” in the bundle of rights that attend private property. 157
This conflict between access and removal that transpires in property law
also takes place in immigration law. The issue in the admissions context is
whether a person should gain entry to the United States. Although the
phrase “Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to be
free” 158 is inscribed on the base of the Statueof Liberty, the United States is
not a place that is publicly available or open to all persons. First, all
persons, citizen and non-citizen alike, are required to present themselves at
a port of entry and seek permission to enter the Untied States.159 Second,
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) details which persons may be
admitted to the United States.160 Citizens may not be excluded from
entering the country; non-citizens, by contrast, may be denied entry. 161
Moreover, non-citizens’ ability to remain in the United States may be cut
off. 162 That is, non-citizens, despite their length of stay in the United States,
may be removed or deported from the country. 163 Thus, the United States’
ability to deny a visa, deny one’s entry to the U.S. border (whether one has
a visa), or remove a non-citizen from the United States are immigration
law’s expressions of the right to exclude.
Recognizing that both property law and immigration law administer who
belongs in a particular space is valuable because it prompts us to examine
both areas of law more closely to consider what lessons may be drawn from
155. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 27 (2010).
156. See Shack, 277 A.2d at 374-75 (discussing whether defendants’ entrance upon
private property to aid migrant farmworkers constituted trespass and invaded possessory
right).
157. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (stating
that “the power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured
strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights”).
158. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, in THE POEMS OF EMMA LAZARUS (1889).
159. See 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (2012) (regulating the admission of citizens and non-citizens in
the United States); Inspection of Persons Applying for Admission, 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a-b)
(2012).
160. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (listing which non-citizens are inadmissible to the United
States).
161. See id.
162. See id. § 1227.
163. “Any alien who is present in the United States in violation of this chapter or any
other law of the United States . . . is deportable.” Id. § 1227(a)(1)(B).
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each one. 164 For instance, as some legal scholars have pointed out, the
traditional view of the absolute right to exclude in property law has changed
over time. Various statutes and public policy reasons have placed
limitations on the ability of possessors of property to exclude non-owners.
Thus, in some contexts, courts have recognized that owners may not
exclude non-owners from their private property. Consider for example a
license. The term license, as noted earlier, refers to a permit. 165 In property
law, a license may be revoked at any time. 166 Yet, it is also the case that at
some point, a license may become irrevocable and this license will become
an implied easement. 167 The holder of this implied easement acquires a
permanent right of access.168 Had this development in property law been
applied in Chae Chan Ping, Ping’s license could have been viewed as some
type of an implied easement, which would have given him the ability to
return to his home.
Indeed, one area in property law that offers a rich site of exploration for
its potential application to immigration law is what scholars refer to as
“social relations theory” of property169 and part of the development of
“progressive” theories in property. 170 This theory moves away from

164. It should be noted that one drawback of examining the property and immigration
analogy is the way in which the non-citizen seeking access to the United States may be
viewed as the “intruder” or burglar in a trespass action. See Volpp, supra note 114, at 467
(examining the concept of the undesirable non-citizen/undocumented immigrant has been
cast as trespassers through local criminal prosecutions).
165. See Holbrook v. Taylor, 532 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Ky. 1976) (discussing license in the
context of easements by estoppel).
166. Indus. Disposal Corp. of America v. City of E. Chicago, Dep’t of Water Works, 407
N.E.2d 1203, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Eileen T. Quigley, Inc. v. Miller Family Farms,
Inc., 629 A.2d 110, 116 (N.J. App. Div. 1993); Tarin's, Inc. v. Tinley, 2000-NMCA-048, ¶
22, 129 N.M. 185, 3 P.3d 680 (Ct. App. 1999) ([N]otice goes to the reasonableness of the
opportunity a licensee is afforded to remove his personal property from the servient estate,
not to the revocability of the license.”); City of Norwood v. Forest Converting Co., 476
N.E.2d 695, 703 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Port of Coos Bay v. Dep’t of Revenue, 691 P.2d 100,
103 (Or. 1984).
167. Holbrook, 532 S.W.2d at 765.
168. See id. at 766.
169. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 2-19 (2001); Stephen R.
Munzer, Property as Social Relations, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY
OF PROPERTY 36 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
170. See Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 743 (2009); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009); Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates:
Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009). But see
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thinking of property as a relationship between a person and thing and
towards thinking of property rights as about the relationship between
persons with respect to valued resources. 171 The starting place in modern
property law is not about one’s ability to exclude from her bounded
property 172 but rather on how property rights have shaped people’s
relationships with each other and how relationships among people have
affected rights to property. 173 This approach to property law recognizes
limits to property rights, including the right to exclude, such that a private
property owner must give way to the rights of non-owners for various
reasons, including public policy. 174
By highlighting the intersection between property and immigration law, I
hope to prompt further examination of how property law might inform the
development of immigration law. There are a number of questions that may
be explored. For instance, what might immigration law learn from
progressive property? What would a “social relations theory” of
immigration law look like? Should there be an unfettered right of return for
lawful permanent residents? Indeed, should there be a right of return for
citizens? 175 And how would a social relations theory of immigration apply
in situations affecting undocumented immigrants who have been criminally
prosecuted for trespass or formerly undocumented immigrants who have
acquired temporary status under the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals? 176 By raising these questions, I hope to encourage further
Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CAL.
L. REV. 107 (2013) (critiquing some progressive property theorists).
171. “The common conception of property as protection of individual control over valued
resources is both intuitively and legally powerful.” Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M.
Penalvar, Joseph William Singer & Laura Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive
Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009).
172. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, REPRESENTATIONS,
Spring 1990, at 162, 169 (discussing how property exacerbates the problem of boundary).
173. See id. at 177 (“Property really is a set of legal rules and norms that structure power
and relationships.”).
174. See id. (“The power to exclude that our legal structure of property gives us is the
starting point of all contract, all negotiation over use of, access to, and exchange of property
and labor.”).
175. See Jeffrey Kahn, International Travel and the Constitution, 56 UCLA L. REV. 271
(2008) (contending that there should be a fundamental right for citizens to return to the
United States); Leti Volpp, Citizenship Undone, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2579, passim (2007)
(examining the ways in which U.S. citizens have been excluded from the country).
176. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir.,
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration on
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exploration of how developments in property law could lead to a more
inclusive immigration law. 177
Conclusion
On June 2, 1887, in accordance with the Chinese Exclusion Act, Chae
Chan Ping obtained the following certificate from the Deputy Collector of
Customs, which stated that:
I certify that the Chinese laborer to whom this certificate is
issued is entitled, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of
Congress, approved May 6th, 1882, as amended by the Act of
July 5th, 1884, to return and re-enter the United States upon
producing and delivering this certificate to the Collector of
Customs of the district at which he shall seek to re-enter.
Witness my hand and official seal, this second day of June,
1887. 178
Ping believed that this certificate guaranteed that he had a right to return to
the United States, which he regarded as his residence for twelve years.
Indeed, he believed that such certificate evidenced a property right.
Rejecting Ping’s asserted property rights, the Supreme Court in Chae Chan
Ping established the absolute right of the United States to exclude noncitizens.
One-hundred-and-twenty-five years later, it is time to reconsider this
absolute right to exclude that animates the plenary power doctrine.
Ultimately, Ping’s property arguments, albeit unsuccessful, forces a reexamination of the role that a non-citizen’s property interests in the United
States should play in their ability to continue residing in this country. At
bottom, Ping’s right to return as property should prompt recognition that

Customs Enforcement 1 (June 15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
177. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 127, at 1084-85. Note that Eleanor Brown has applied
Reich’s theory in the context of visas for guest workers. To be sure, immigration law has
recognized some exceptions to the right to exclude. For instance, the INA provides that
persons who have a credible fear of being persecuted may be interviewed for purposes of
determining whether they should be granted asylum, which would give them lawful
permanent residency. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012). Moreover, as previously explained, courts
have placed limitations on the ability of immigration officers to exclude certain non-citizens,
such as lawful permanent residents, by ensuring that their exclusion hearings are subject to
due process. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 28-29 (1982).
178. Chae Chan Ping’s Reentry Certificate, supra note 38.
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persons who have spent considerable time in the United States deserve the
right to return, reside and/or remain in the country that they call their home.
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